分享自己在26年开端看到的一篇好文：https://substack.com/home/post/p-182789127
- 部分关键内容如下：
If you want to inherit (or want your heirs or favored philanthropic causes to inherit) a non-negligible share of the pie—that is, if you are concerned with your place in the future distribution, rather than your absolute future budget—the broad implications of this section are straightforward. While you are not among the world’s richest actors, start accumulating capital as early as possible. Get into (or start) those private firms with the AI intangibles. Invest unusually risk-tolerantly: you will probably go bust, but it is your only hope of catching up. Especially among illiquid investments, prioritize those in which the capital is mobile and not quickly bottlenecked by natural resources, if there is a risk that some shock or tax will hit the country where it is located. And if you do make it to the top, save almost everything; invest it in the precise way that balances the need to keep growing with the need to avoid going bust; and try hard to tie your hands and the hands of your inheritors.
如果你希望（或者希望你的继承人或青睐的慈善事业能够继承）相当一部分财富——也就是说，如果你关心的是自己在未来财富分配中的位置，而非未来的绝对预算——那么本节的广泛含义就很明确了。尽管你并非全球最富有的群体之一，但要尽早开始积累资本。加入（或创办）那些拥有人工智能无形资产的私营公司。以超乎寻常的风险承受能力进行投资：你很可能会破产，但这是你唯一的赶超机会。特别是在非流动性投资中，如果存在某种冲击或税收可能影响资本所在国家的风险，要优先选择那些资本具有流动性且不会因自然资源而迅速陷入瓶颈的投资。如果你真的跻身顶层，要把几乎所有财富都存起来；以一种精确的方式进行投资，在保持增长的需求和避免破产的需求之间取得平衡；并努力约束自己和继承人的行为。
There are a few ways beyond direct redistribution that the state could slow or halt a “Pikettian inequality spiral” in an automated economy.
在自动化经济中，除了直接的再分配之外，国家还有几种方法可以减缓或阻止“皮凯蒂式的不平等螺旋”。
First, by making it easier for small investors to pool their resources until their returns match those of large investors. For instance, we could deregulate how banks, or at least some banks, can invest their savings deposits, even if this implicitly means that the banks are subsidized with stronger deposit insurance.
首先，通过让小投资者更容易集中他们的资源，直到他们的回报与大投资者的回报相当。例如，我们可以放宽对银行（或者至少是部分银行）如何投资其储蓄存款的监管，即便这意味着银行会间接受益于更有力的存款保险补贴。
Second, and relatedly, by making it easier for firms—or at least the kinds of firms most likely to exhibit outsized growth—to go public (or harder for them to stay private). This could be done by loosening the regulatory requirements on public firms (or tightening them on private firms), or simply by taxing them at different rates.24
其次，与此相关的是，通过降低公司——至少是那些最有可能呈现超常规增长的公司——上市的难度（或者说增加它们保持私有状态的难度）。这可以通过放宽对上市公司的监管要求（或者收紧对私有公司的监管要求）来实现，或者 simply 通过对它们征收不同的税率
Third, by imposing on individuals the same regulation already imposed on foundations to prevent them from growing too quickly: a spending requirement. A minimum spending rate—either on an annual basis or, by capping inheritances, over a lifetime—would prevent those inclined to adopt high saving rates from outgrowing the rest.25 Functionally, assuming that any unspent income below the requirement is confiscated, a spending minimum is just a somewhat ham-fisted 100% tax on saving above some bar. But if enforced, it would certainly limit income divergence; and its simplicity, and the fact that it need not be framed as a tax, may be valuable. Likewise, though a maximum spending rate is essentially unheard of today (except in the sense that people cannot withdraw their social security while they are still young), in the absence of other redistributive measures it might be necessary to prevent the bottom end of the income distribution from collapsing, via people permanently spending down the assets on which they and their heirs will have to rely forever.
第三，对个人实施已适用于基金会的相同规定，以防止他们增长过快：一项支出要求。最低支出率——无论是按年度计算，还是通过限制遗产在一生中的支出——都将防止那些倾向于采取高储蓄率的人远远超过其他人。25 从功能上讲，假设任何未达到要求的未支出收入都会被没收，那么最低支出要求实际上就是对超过某一标准的储蓄征收一种略显笨拙的100%税收。但如果能够执行，它肯定会限制收入差距的扩大；而且其简单性，以及它不必被界定为税收这一事实，可能具有一定价值。同样，尽管目前最高支出率基本上闻所未闻（除了人们在年轻时无法提取社会保障金这一情况），但在缺乏其他再分配措施的情况下，可能有必要通过防止人们永久性地消耗他们及其继承人将永远依赖的资产，来避免收入分配底层的崩溃。
Whether this would be a desirable or undesirable development is up for debate, and well beyond the scope of this already rambling essay. A widely celebrated byproduct (and cause) of the Industrial Revolution was the shift in wealth and ultimately political power away from a hyper-conservative, decadent landowning aristocracy to a bourgeois middle class that prized experimentation, thrift, and hard work. For better or worse, once the robots are doing all the work, wealth and power will shift again. Whether the optimal distribution of capital in the 22nd century is equal or otherwise, we can agree with Piketty that it may not emerge by default.
这究竟是一种可取的还是不可取的发展，仍有待商榷，而且这也远远超出了这篇本就有些冗长的文章的讨论范围。工业革命一个广受赞誉的附带成果（也是其成因之一）是财富乃至政治权力的转移——从极度保守、奢靡的土地贵族阶层转向了崇尚实验、节俭和勤奋工作的资产阶级中产阶级。无论结果是好是坏，一旦机器人承担了所有工作，财富和权力都将再次发生转移。无论22世纪资本的最优分配是平均的还是其他形式，我们都能认同皮凯蒂的观点，即这种最优分配或许不会自然而然地出现。
- 全文带中文翻译如下：
